The Impact of Sturgis on Bargaining Power for Contingent Workers in the U.S. Labor Market by Hely, Michael J.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 11 Promoting Justice Through Interdisciplinary Teaching, Practice, and Scholarship 
January 2003 
The Impact of Sturgis on Bargaining Power for Contingent 
Workers in the U.S. Labor Market 
Michael J. Hely 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael J. Hely, The Impact of Sturgis on Bargaining Power for Contingent Workers in the U.S. Labor 
Market, 11 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 295 (2003), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol11/iss1/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Impact of Sturgis on Bargaining Power for 
Contingent Workers in the U.S. Labor Market 
Michael J. Hely∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In M.B. Sturgis, Inc. and Jeffboat Division (Sturgis),1 decided in 
August, 2000, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held that 
contingent workers could be included alongside core workers2 in 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2003, Washington University School of Law.  
 1. M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000). See also Interstate Warehousing of 
Ohio, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (2001) (holding contingent workers from supplier work alongside 
core workers under same conditions, who were “largely interchangeable” with core workers, 
and where user employer hired all of its workforce from supplier, the contingent workers should 
be included in the bargaining unit with core workers); Outokumpu Copper Franklin, Inc., 334 
N.L.R.B. No. 39 (2001) (ruling that contingent workers must be included with core workers 
with whom they share job duties, where user employer sets all conditions of employment for 
contingent workers and hires core workers from pool of agency-supplied contingent workers); 
but cf. Engineered Storage Products Co. and Teamsters Local 330, 334 N.L.R.B. No. 138 
(where supplier hires and fires, sets wages and conditions of contingent workers in joint-
employer situation, community of interest is not strong enough for contingent workers and core 
workers to be included in same bargaining unit). 
 2. A “core worker” is an employee solely employed by a “user employer.” A “user 
employer” is the term for an employer who hires “core workers” and/or “contingent workers” 
for its own use—oversees hiring the workers out to third parties. For the sake of clarity, this 
Note borrows the NLRB terminology—except that this Note uses “core worker” instead of the 
NLRB’s rather unfortunate and misleading appellation, “user employee,” to refer to core 
workers. The NLRB refers elsewhere to these employees as “permanent,” “core,” “single-
employer employees,” or “regular” employees. This Note presumes, unless noted otherwise, 
that when discussing bargaining units in connection with contingent workers, core workers 
share the same job duties as contingent workers. 
 The NLRB uses the term “contingent workers” to refer to workers who are recruited and 
hired by an agency or company that supplies employees to another enterprise. Id. at 3. 
Contingent workers are elsewhere classified, inter alia, as “temporary workers,” or “leased 
workers.” The NLRB uses the term “supplier” to refer to the agency or company that supplies 
employees.  
 This Note is chiefly concerned with supplied contingent workers, but much has been 
written about contingent workers and independent contractors employed by a single employer, 
such as those whom Microsoft uses as a regular part of its operations. See, e.g., Victoria 
Roberts, Economy: Attorneys, Staffing Firms, Advocates Differ on Upshot of Microsoft Rulings, 
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creating a collective bargaining unit,3 without the consent of both the 
supplier agencies and user employers. The ruling is a historic 
departure from longstanding NLRB policy that contingent workers 
could not accrete4 to a core unit without the consent of both the user 
and the supplier.5  
 
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 17, 2000, at C-1.  
 3. The collective bargaining unit is the group of workers that a union organizes and then 
represents after it is certified. Under § 9 of the National Labor Relations Act, the NLRB must 
determine the proper bargaining unit where the union and the employer do not agree. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 159 (1994) [hereinafter NLRA]; see also, e.g., MICHAEL R. CARRELL & CHRISTINA 
HEAVRIN, LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CASES, PRACTICE, AND LAW 
120 (5th ed. 1998). Jobs, not individuals, comprise the bargaining unit membership. For 
example, a unit may be comprised of all mechanics, or of a whole class of jobs such as 
administrative workers, including secretaries, filing clerks, information techs, etc. The NLRA 
allows any job classifications to be included in a bargaining unit so long as it does not include 
professionals without their consent. NLRA § 9(a). Carrell & Heavrin list a variety of factors 
used in determining bargaining units. Among them are community of interest (the doctrine at 
the crux of Sturgis, to be discussed infra), the history of bargaining between a particular unit 
and an employer, the employees’ wishes, prior unionization, the relationship of the bargaining 
unit to the employer’s organizational structure, and the public interest. CARRELL & HEAVRIN, 
supra, at 120-23. 
 If there is a dispute over the composition of a bargaining unit, the NLRB decides the 
appropriate bargaining unit. NLRA § 9(a). The NLRB decides this based on the commonalities 
shared by the workers, or whether a “community of interest” exists. To determine whether an 
appropriate community of interest exists, the NLRB examines, inter alia, salaries, hours, how 
hired/terminated, and mobility between jobs. Francis M. Flougherty, Annotation, “Community 
of Interest” Test in NLRB Determination of Appropriateness of Bargaining Unit, 90 A.L.R. 
FED. 16 (1988).  
 A common question becomes whether all the employees at one location should be part of 
one unit or different units. Historically, the disputes have been over the inclusion of craft and 
industrial workers into a unit. Sturgis represents the latest major change in the form these 
disputes have taken, where an employee’s permanence, or lack thereof, is a greater issue than 
her skill set. 
 4. Labor law uses the term “accretion” to denote the addition of workers to a pre-existing 
collective bargaining unit. 
 5. The previous policy, established in the 1990 Lee Hospital decision, considered 
contingent workers working for user employers to be part of a multiemployer unit. 300 
N.L.R.B. 947 (1990). Under Lee Hospital, multiemployer units included both units comprised 
of core and contingent workers working for one user, as well as workers from one supplier who 
may work for several different employers. Id. As a multiemployer unit, the Board in Lee 
Hospital held that, according to the well-established Greenhoot doctrine, both employers had to 
consent before contingent workers and user employees could form a bargaining unit together. 
Id. at 948 (citing Greenhoot, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 250 (1973)). The Sturgis decision thereby 
overruled Lee Hospital in toto, and clarified its position on multiemployer units found at 
multiple user employers, versus joint employer units found at single user employers. Sturgis, 
331 N.L.R.B. at 1298. 
 In its amicus brief, AFL-CIO argued that Greenhoot should be overruled as Lee Hospital 
had been. Id. at 1300. It argued that appropriate units should be decided on the basis of 
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Currently, NLRB-watchers are wondering whether the new 
Republican-controlled NLRB will reverse its decision in Sturgis.6 As 
observers expect that President George W. Bush’s nominees will take 
the side of management over organized labor and individual workers’ 
concerns, those who predict Sturgis’ reversal clearly see the case as a 
pro-labor decision. Its effect on the workplace, however, is still less 
than clear. Commentators vary greatly in the importance they attach 
to Sturgis. Some view it as a breakthrough for union organizing,7 as 
protection for a vulnerable portion of the working population,8 or as 
an interference in both employer-employee relations and in employee 
autonomy.9 Some experts contend that Sturgis is hardly significant at 
all.10 None of these individuals, however, appear to consider why 
unions have taken diverse, often conflicting, viewpoints of the issues 
in Sturgis, whether accretion is best for contingent workers, or if the 
current collective bargaining system will best meet their needs.  
Part II of this Note outlines the main players in Sturgis: contingent 
workers, users, and core workers. Part III of this Note examines 
 
community of interest, regardless of employer consent. Id. at 1300-01. 
 Nancy Schiffer, associate general counsel for AFL-CIO, argues in her article, Organizing 
Contingency Workers: Community of Interest v. Consent, 17 LAB. LAW. 1, 67 (2001), that 
Sturgis did not go far enough for the same reason—that the NLRB should have overruled 
Greenhoot in toto. Id. Schiffer argues that Greenhoot perpetuates the mistaken rule that 
employers must consent to a unit consisting of a single supplier and multiple user employers, as 
a multiemployer unit. Id. at 171-73. The same reasons that the Board used in Sturgis for 
overturning Lee Hospital, where there were multiple suppliers and a single user employer, 
should logically apply to Greenhoot. Id. Further, Schiffer contends that Greenhoot’s holding is 
contrary to the legislative history of the NLRA, to NLRB precedent, and “any legitimate 
statutory policy. Id. at 171.  
 Conversely, labor lawyer Robert W. Tollen argues that multiemployer units should still 
apply where there is one supplier with multiple users, as well as multiple-user and multiple-
supplier arrangements. Robert W. Tollen, When Is a Multiemployer Bargaining Unit a 
“Multiemployer Bargaining Unit?, 17 LAB. LAW. 183 (2001).  
 6. See, e.g., Tamara Loomis, Power Shift: NLRB Reversals May Be on the Horizon. Bush 
Appointees Will Overturn Key Labor Law Rulings, Experts Predict, NAT. L.J., July 29, 2002, at 
B11. 
 7. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Dolin & Scott V. Rozmus, NLRB Trend Of Easing Union-
Organizing Activities Continues, EMP. L. STRATEGIST, Jan. 2001, at 1.  
 8. See, e.g., Mark H. Floyd, Union Organizing of Temporary Employees Subject to New 
Standards, 37 TENN. B. J. 23 (Jan. 2001).  
 9. Greenbaum Doll & McDonald PLLC, You May Have to Bargain with a Union Your 
Employees Don’t Want, 11 NO. 2 KY. EMP. L. LTR. 1 (2000). 
 10. See Susan J. McGolrick, Contingent Workers: Will NLRB’s Recent Sturgis Ruling 
Help or Hurt Organizing, Bargaining?, 173 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Sept. 6, 2000, at AA-2. 
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Sturgis, the mechanisms of bargaining unit accretion, and the degree 
to which it blurs the roles of these players. Part IV discusses the 
impact of the Sturgis decision and examines how labor market forces 
might correct for its shortcomings. Part V concludes with 
recommendations for achieving greater bargaining power for 
contingent workers. 
II. PLAYERS IN THE CONTEMPORARY LABOR MARKET 
A. Users, Core Workers, and Contingent Workers in the Labor 
Market 
The contemporary economy emphasizes mobility and flexibility, 
and contingent workers are attractive to user employers because of 
their flexibility.11 In order to stay afloat, managers must heed this 
imperative for meeting fluxes in the business cycle. These fluxes 
increasingly demand versatility, not just in production quotas, but in 
the labor supply, in accordance with supply and demand.12 A steady 
 
 11. See, e.g., SUSAN N. HOUSEMAN, WHY EMPLOYERS USE FLEXIBLE STAFFING 
ARRANGEMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM AN ESTABLISHMENT SURVEY (Upjohn Institute Staff 
Working Paper NO. 01-67, 2d rev., Oct. 2000). See also Bita Rahebi, Comment, Rethinking the 
National Labor Relations Board’s Treatment of Temporary Workers: Granting Greater Access 
to Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1105 (2000). 
 12. See, e.g., PAUL OSTERMAN, SECURING PROSPERITY: THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MARKET: HOW IT HAS CHANGED & WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (1999). Writing in a good year for 
the stock-market and for supply-side economists, Osterman warns:  
[D]espite good economic news on many dimensions, there remains a widespread sense 
that the labor market is a riskier and more dangerous place than in the past. In some 
measure this feeling is based on what is in the air, as many firms continue to 
restructure and rhetoric takes hold proclaiming that everyone is responsible for his or 
own career and that one can expect little from one’s employer. . . . [W]hile many 
people are benefiting from the new economy, a larger number are not, and inequality 
has grown. 
Id. at 3. 
 The supplier industry’s spokesgroup, The American Staffing Association, rather succinctly 
summed up why unions are concerned with this issue: 
Unions’ share of the private-sector workforce in the United States has shrunk to less 
than 10 percent, forcing organized labor to look for ways to stem the decline. 
According to a recent report from the General Accounting Office, from 1982 to 1998, 
the number of jobs in the staffing industry dramatically rose by 577 percent, whereas 
the number of jobs in the entire workforce grew by 41 percent. 
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core of workers whose numbers remain static in the face of all but the 
most extreme market fluctuations is disappearing in accordance with 
this demand for versatility. Consequently, while profits may increase, 
workers share less of the profitability than ever before.13 Earnings 
have not kept pace with increases in productivity.14 There has been a 
decrease in the number of permanent jobs with full benefits. Many 
positions have seen a decrease in compensation.15 The recent slowing 
of the U.S. economy has shown that we are not immune from the 
business cycle, and that employers are quite devoted to the 
proposition that all positions are created fungible.16 Employers, 
 
American Staffing Association, Unions at the Door? They’ll Huff and They’ll Puff, but They 
Can’t Blow Your Staffing Firm Down, STAFFING TODAY-STAFFING SUCCESS, Sept. 2001, 
available at http://staffingtoday.com/memberserv/1100ss/story2.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2002). 
 This is consistent with the report by the National Alliance for Fair Employment (NAFFE), 
the AFL/CIO’s organizing campaign for contingent workers. NAFFE, Contingent Work and 
Organized Labor, at http://www.fairjobs.org/report/orglabor.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2002). 
“[A] growing sector of contingent jobs in any workplace, company, or industry threatens to 
undermine hard-won standards for all workers as those in standard jobs lose their leverage in 
collective bargaining.” Id. 
 Leo Troy applauds the existence of non-union jobs as an indication that U.S. workers 
eschew organization in favor of what he calls “individual representation,” where the worker 
fends for herself in the job marketplace and negotiates for compensation as an individual rather 
than collectively. LEO TROY, BEYOND UNIONS & COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 16 (1999). Troy 
views the statistic that ninety percent of U.S. private-sector workers are not union members as 
an empirical demonstration that “the majority believe that the market can satisfy their needs and 
consequently prefer and vote for individual rather than organized representation.” Id. He quotes 
the Harris survey, conducted for the AFL-CIO in 1984, to support this idea that the preference 
for non-union jobs is pragmatic, rather than ideological: the workers polled simply saw unions 
as “irrelevant.” Id. at 17 (quoting HARRIS, LOUIS, AND ASSOCIATES, A STUDY ON THE 
OUTLOOK FOR TRADE UNION ORGANIZING, STUDY NO. 84308 (1984)). 
 13. TROY, supra note 12, at 89. 
 14. Id. at 89.  
 15. Id.  
 16. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the 
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001). Many 
“dynamic” U.S. employers have “radically transformed their employment practices” in the past 
decade, substituting practices that emphasize flexibility for the old ways. Id. at 523. Employers 
therefore highly value workers who are versatile in terms of skills and their ability to move 
between job assignments. Id.  
 But see a study by Susan M. Houseman of the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 
and Anne E. Polivka of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, THE IMPLICATIONS OF FLEXIBLE 
STAFFING ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOB STABILITY, which argues that workers in a variety of 
flexible work arrangements experience only moderately less job stability. UPJOHN INSTITUTE, 
STAFF WORKING PAPER NO. 99-056, Feb. 1998, rev. May 1999. Job instability is greatest 
among contingent workers working for supplier agencies, however. Id. at 12.  
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therefore, lay off scores of core and contingent workers when 
downturns occur.17 Indeed, much of the value that contingent workers 
have for an employer is to provide a “buffer” staff that can absorb the 
shock of economic downturns.18 The current spate of layoffs in core 
positions makes it clear that contingent workers do not absorb all of 
the shock.19 
All of us work in a climate where economic exigencies require us 
to serve at some point as a “buffer” for other market players (core 
workers, stockholders, or perhaps colleagues), regardless of whether 
we are currently served by any buffers ourselves. If job fungibility 
increases according to the above predictions, so will the resemblance 
between the average job on the market and the jobs currently 
available in the contingent labor market. 
B. Contingent Workers 
Contingent workers are an almost infinitely diverse group. They 
range from unskilled or semi-skilled workers, who are looking for 
permanent work, to highly skilled workers who may be called 
independent contractors, and who may not be seeking permanent 
 
 17. See, e.g., Goodrich to Cut 2,400 Jobs, Close 16 Plants, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 26, 2001, at E1 (layoffs due to decline in airline industry leading to 
profits less than previously forecast); Earnings, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 27, 2001, at 1G 
(“Crawford cutting 95 Atlanta jobs as rising costs hurt bottom line. . . . Crawford & Co., an 
insurance services company, reported lower third-quarter earnings and announced about 95 job 
cuts in Atlanta.”).  
 18. See KATHERINE G. ABRAHAM & SUSAN N. HOUSEMAN, JOB SECURITY IN AMERICA: 
LESSONS FROM GERMANY 86-95 (1993) (comparing the use of “short term” workers versus 
layoffs to adjust for market dips); see also STANLEY NOLLEN & HELEN AXEL, MANAGING 
CONTINGENT WORKERS: HOW TO REAP THE BENEFITS AND REDUCE THE RISKS 138-39 
(AMACOM 1996). The idea of a “buffer” of contingent workers caught on in the 1980s as a 
way of ensuring some employment security for core employees. NOLLEN & AXEL, supra, at 39. 
John Atkinson at the U.K.’s Sussex University articulated a “core-ring” model that put 
permanent, full-time workers at the core, while the “ring” was made up of contingent workers, 
hourly part-timers, and independent contractors. Id. at 38 (citing John Atkinson, Manpower 
Strategies for Flexible Organizations, Personnel Mgmt. (BNA) (Aug. 1984)). The “buffer” 
strategy serves to prevent the financial and morale costs (to permanent staff) of laying off 
workers; supplier agencies promote this idea to potential users as a way of increasing the use of 
contingent workers. Id. at 39.  
 This use of contingent workers as a “buffer” may have consequences for organizing 
combined units of contingent and core workers. See infra, Part IV, for a further discussion of 
this issue. 
 
 19. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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jobs.20 The majority, however, are clerical or light industrial 
workers.21 Many are looking for full-time, permanent work with 
benefits.22 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ broadest 
measurement, contingent workers make up four percent of the U.S. 
workforce.23 Manpower Temporaries, Inc. boasts that it is the single 
largest employer in the United States.24 Contingent workers are a 
 
 20. In its 2001 study on contingent workers, based upon data from the Current Population 
Survey, the Bureau of Labor Statistics defines contingent workers as “those who do not have an 
explicit or implicit contract for long-term employment.” Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contingent 
And Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 2001 (May 24, 2001) [hereinafter BLS 
2001], available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2002).  
 The Bureau of Labor Statistics used several factors in discerning a contingent employment 
arrangement: 
[W]hether the job was temporary or not expected to continue, how long the worker 
expected to be able to hold the job, and how long the worker had held the job. For 
workers who had a job with an intermediary, namely a temporary help agency or a 
contract company, information was collected about their employment at the place they 
were assigned to work by the intermediary as well as their employment with the 
intermediary itself. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contingent And Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 
2001 Technical Note (May 24, 2001), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp. 
tn.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2002). 
 21. A 2000 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics survey of contingent workforce at supplier 
agencies for the year 1998 lists 1,178,176 out of a total 3,229,700, or 36.5% of the contingent 
workforce is made up of administrative/clerical workers. In addition, 987,143, or 30.6%, of 
contingent workers worked as “operators, fabricators, and laborers” (often referred to as “light 
industrial” or low-skilled industrial workers). By contrast, “professional specialty” made up 
4.9% of the workforce, precision production, craft, and repair, 7.1%, and executive-managerial 
workers 4.8%. Accord, ROBERT E. PARKER, FLESH PEDDLERS AND WARM BODIES: THE 
TEMPORARY HELP INDUSTRY AND ITS WORKERS 31 (1994) (citing telephone interview with 
Bruce Steinberg, The National Association of Temporary Services spokesperson (Nov. 19, 
1993)). 
 22. Sturgis’ Effect on Temp Organizing Debated, 165 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 289, 291 
(Nov. 6, 2000); see also PARKER, supra note 21, at 17.  
 The Bureau of Labor Statistics found that 44.4 percent of supplier-agency contingent 
workers preferred a “traditional arrangement,” 44.3 percent preferred an “indirect or alternative 
arrangement,” and 5.7 surveyed said “it depends” (data was not available for 5.4 percent of 
those surveyed). Table 11, Employed Workers With Alternative Work Arrangements By Their 
Preference For A Traditional Work Arrangement, February 2001, available at http://www.bls. 
gov/news.release/conemp.t11.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).  
 For terms and definitions regarding contingent workers, see Anne E. Polivka, Contingent 
and Alternative Work Arrangements, Defined, 119 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 (1996). 
 23. BLS 2001, supra note 20, at 3.  
 24. Schiffer, supra note 5, at 168 (citing David Wessel, Temp Workers Have Lasting 
Effect, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2001, at A1). This may be a misleading statistic, however. Supplier 
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segment whose force extends well beyond its plethora of job 
descriptions. The use of contingent workers in the job market 
destabilizes job security for all employees, for where some workers 
receive lower pay and no benefits, the competition for permanent 
positions may erode gains made in compensation on permanent 
jobs.25 
Women and minorities make up a disproportionate percentage of 
the population of contingent workers.26 Thus the rift between 
historically privileged and historically marginalized populations will 
widen as certain populations disproportionately hold the insecure, 
low-wage jobs that characterize the majority of contingent jobs.27 
Since the “welfare reform” or Personal Responsibility Act of 1996,28 
 
agencies such as Manpower often hire contingent workers for just a few months during a year. 
The cumulative comings and goings of contingent workers during a year’s time may be quite 
high while the tenure of each worker may be quite short. Interview with Mindy Marks, Olin 
Fellow in Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, Mo. (Feb. 9, 2002). 
 25. See 142 CONG. REC. H14736-03 (daily ed. June 19, 1996) (Statement of Rep. Patricia 
Schroeder, Extension of Remarks on the Part-Time and Temporary Workers Protection Act); 
see also Parker, supra note 21, at 57.  
 For an explanation of basic principles of labor market supply and demand, see ARTHUR 
O’SULLIVAN & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, MICROECONOMICS PRINCIPLES AND TOOLS, 277-78 (2d 
ed. 2001). 
 26. BLS 2001, supra note 20, at 5. For a discussion of the composition of contingent 
workers and the implications of this phenomenon, see Ann Polivka, A Profile of Contingent 
Workers, 119 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 10 (1996). 
 For a breakdown of the disparity in wages between contingent workers and core 
(“noncontingent”) workers, see Steven Hipple & Jay Stewart, Earnings and Benefits of 
Contingent and Noncontingent Workers, 119 MONTHLY LAB. REP. 22 (1996). The differential 
is very clear: in 1995, the median weekly earnings of contingent workers working full-time was 
only $385 to the $479 earned by their full-time core counterparts. Id. at 23. Part-time contingent 
workers earned $109 to the core workers’ $138 per week. Id. 
 27. The other end of the scale from poorly-compensated, unskilled work is the technical 
worker hired as an independent contractor. There were 8.6 million workers identified as 
independent contractors in 2001, constituting 6.4 percent of total employment. BLS 2001, supra 
note 20, at 3 (excluding independent contractors working longer-term jobs from the population 
of contingent workers). White men generally make up most of this population, which is reputed 
to be more satisfied with the higher earnings that their skills afford them. Id. at 4; see also 
Schiffer, supra note 5, at 168. The recent and widely-publicized employment litigation at 
Microsoft belies the idea that these workers are satisfied with their lot, however. Vizcaino v. 
Microsoft Corp., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (2001). Microsoft classified these workers, whose 
arrangements resembled core workers in all but compensation, as independent contractors. In a 
class action suit, these workers won damages and many workers received core worker status. 
Susan McGolrick, Benefits: Judge Approves $27 Million Fee Award for Attorneys In Microsoft 
Class Action, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) (Apr. 24, 2001). 
 28. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol11/iss1/12
p295 Hely note book pages.doc  1/14/2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]  The Impact of Sturgis 303 
 
many people who had been on the welfare roles were forced to take 
low-paying jobs, including jobs as contingent workers.29 Many have 
had to make permanent careers as contingent workers, because either 
a lack of skills or other barriers, which put them on the welfare roles 
in the first place,30 may continue to prevent them from obtaining 
permanent work.31 A flood of under-skilled workers compels 
employers to make positions more fungible, require fewer skills, and 
offer less compensation.32 As this trend continues, employers may 
replace core positions with these more fungible, lower-skilled 
positions.33 
Contingent workers, from day laborers and garment workers to 
computer technicians and adjunct professors, have recently devised 
diverse means of organizing.34 Some of this organizing has taken 
 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
 29. See Craig L. Briskin & Kimberly A. Thomas, Note, The Waging of Welfare: All Work 
and No Pay?, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 559, 589 (1998). 
 30. One should note two qualifications before accepting the premise that “welfare” 
recipients (generally defined as participants in entitlement programs in which they receive cash 
grants such as Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) or Social Security Disability, 
usually combined with medical benefits and/or Food Stamps) are on welfare because they lack 
skills. One reason is that, according to Federal Reserve policy, “healthy” unemployment is at 
about 6.2%. To prevent the economy from “overheating,” the Reserve tends to raise interest 
rates when unemployment dips below this number. Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), 
Extra! (May/June 1995), at http://www.fair.org/extra/9505/welfare-myths.html (last visited Jan. 
14, 2002). A second reason is that the majority of welfare recipients are on “welfare” (the 
general term usually used to refer to Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF, formerly 
known as Aid for Families with Dependent Children or AFDC), a cash grant with medical 
benefits) for relatively short periods of time. Time on Welfare and Welfare Dependency: 
Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Human 
Resources, 104th Cong. 70-72 (1996) (statement of LaDonna A. Pavetti, Ph.D., Research 
Associate, The Urban Institute), available at http://www.urban.org/welfare/pavtes.htm (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2002). 
 Nevertheless, as Dr. Pavetti contends, many welfare recipients in the pre-“welfare reform” 
era (Pavetti estimates 70%) were returning to the rolls within five years. Sixty percent remained 
on welfare for more than two years, and two-thirds of the recipients averaged five or more years 
on welfare. Id.  
 31. For a discussion of former welfare recipients being channeled into insecure jobs, see 
National Alliance for Fair Employment (NAFFE), Contingent Work, Low Wage, and Poverty, 
at http://www.fairjobs.org/report/poverty.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).  
 32. NAFFE, supra note 31. 
 33. E-mail from Catherine Ruckelshaus, Litigation Director, National Employment Law 
Project (Oct. 5, 2001 16:34 CST) (on file with the Washington University Journal of Law & 
Policy); see also PARKER, supra note 21, at 137-153. 
 34. See, e.g., National Alliance for Fair Employment (NAFFE), Workers in Contingent 
Jobs Are Fighting Back, at http://www.fairjobs.org/report/fightback.php (last visited Feb. 18, 
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place at a particular user employer site where the contingent workers 
are solely or jointly employed.35  
Many of these contingent workers have organized using a hiring 
hall approach.36 Experts such as Stephen Rush point out that 
organizing in a hiring hall fashion has worked well, typically for 
certain multiemployer jobs such as longshoring and construction.37 It 
may be that if the hiring hall model were extended to a wider body of 
contingent workers who now work out of supplier agencies, then 
employers, agencies, and contingent workers might benefit.38 
Contingent workers could organize as a unit, moving from job to job, 
while retaining the benefits of union membership.39 Employers would 
enjoy the flexible workforce that they may have lost if contingent 
workers were to join with core workers in a bargaining unit, thus 
allowing them to bargain for similar security and compensation as 
core workers.  
However, several problems exist with this model. First, the main 
 
2002) (discussing hiring hall organization in Chicago, day laborers’ center in Portland, Ore., 
and skilled workers organization at Microsoft (“WashTech”) for benefits & parity pay). 
See also Schiffer, supra note 6, at 169-70, for a discussion of contingent workers who were 
successful at organizing in a single-employer situation. Schiffer cites Temlaco, Inc, Corporate 
Personnel & Contingent Workers, Inc. and Waste Management Inc., 15-RC-2901, where the 
employers used contingent workers exclusively for jobs in home health care and sanitation 
services. Id.  
 35. Id. 
 36. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 1125-27 (13th ed. 2001). The hiring hall model 
is one whereby a union sets up a single point of hire for its members. When an employer 
contacts the hiring hall, the union consults its list of available workers. Employers signing a 
hiring agreement with one of these halls typically obliges itself to hire exclusively from that 
hiring hall. Similarly, workers affiliated with the union hiring hall are barred from seeking work 
outside of union referrals. For examples of such agreements, see General Bldg. Contractors 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982); NLRB v. Int’l Bhd. of Electrical Workers 
Local 322, AFL-CIO, 597 F.2d 1326 (1979). 
 37. COX ET AL., supra note 36. 
 38. Rush contends that in a market with a high turnover, the hiring hall set-up can be a 
significant advantage to both employer and workers who are looking for each other. Id. at 89-90 
(citing ROBERT J. FLANAGAN ET AL., ECONOMICS OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 576-78 
(1989)) (discussing frictional employment, where workers are between jobs). 
 39. For a discussion about the possibility of organizing contingent workers by hiring hall, 
see DAVID WEIL, TURNING THE TIDE: STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR LABOR UNIONS 105-06 
(1994). Weil points out that this has some historical precedent, such as when waitresses 
organized by hiring halls in the 1900s, and again in the 1930s and 1960s. Id. at 106 (citing 
Dorothy Sue Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Work Force: Lessons from the History of 
Waitress Unionism, 3 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 419, 419-36 (1991); DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, 
DISHING IT OUT: WAITRESSES AND THEIR UNIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991)). 
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tool of competition for hiring halls is the ability to provide a 
locatable, ready store of skilled workers.40 Employers are generally 
able to find unskilled workers more easily than skilled workers.41 If 
potential users of contingent workers could find skilled workers 
available through non-unionized supplier agencies, then there is 
almost no chance that the users would “salt” their ranks with 
unionized, likely better-compensated, contingent workers.42 In cases 
of fierce competition for unskilled work, union contracts may not 
provide many more advantages than their non-unionized 
competition—perhaps not even enough to offset the cost of union 
 
 40. See WEIL, supra note 39. In his discussion of waitress hiring halls, Weil concurs: “The 
basis of the leverage exerted by [the waitresses’] hiring halls stemmed both from their ability to 
provide restaurant employers a skilled and stable work force and from their potential to act as a 
source for organizing pressure against employers via picketing, consumer boycotts, and 
strikes.” Id. at 106. 
 41. Employers’ relative difficulty in finding skilled workers is especially pronounced in 
areas with a large number of unskilled workers. In the “welfare-to-work” scenario many 
communities foster employers’ use of unskilled, poorly-paid workers who are desperate for 
work out of fear of losing their continued health insurance and food-stamp entitlements (which 
are necessary adjuncts to the below-poverty wages most participants receive as they enter or re-
enter the workforce). In this author’s experience working with welfare-to-work participants in 
depressed Midwestern communities, hiring halls for skilled trades may continue to provide their 
members with decent, union jobs with benefits alongside a large unskilled workforce. Unskilled 
workers compete for below-poverty wage jobs while governmental and non-governmental job 
development programs attempt to provide some of these unskilled workers with work skills and 
opportunities for employment. Some of these programs even include transportation to the 
employer’s doorstep. For many of these workers, contingent supplier agencies are the only 
realistic providers for jobs until the workers have immersed or re-immersed themselves in the 
work setting and acquired some skills. These job development programs go beyond the typical 
supplier agency-user arrangements, in that they provide personalized follow-up counseling for 
workers on the job and job developing services at no cost to the employer. For examples of 
some of these programs, see the Welfare to Work Partnership’s homepage, at 
http://www.welfaretowork.org (last visited Feb. 16, 2002); see also the web page of East-West 
Gateway Coordinating Council (St. Louis, Missouri’s Metropolitan planning organization), at 
http://www.ewgateway.org/labormkt/Bridges2000/bridges2000.htm (last updated June 12, 
2001) regarding Bridges 2000 (jobs and transportation program); see also the Oakland Private 
Industry Council’s program page, at http://www.oaklandpic.org (last visited Feb. 16, 2002) 
(listing benefits to potential employers and trainees). 
 An idea worth investigating, therefore, may be for unions to take over these quasi-
governmental programs and provide these same services in an organized setting. 
 42. “Salting” refers to the practice whereby a union attempts to infiltrate and unionize an 
employer’s ranks. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) introduced this 
practice in the 1980s. CARRELL & HEAVRIN, supra note 3, at 25-26. The United States Supreme 
Court held in 1995 that employers may not discriminate against applicants who are paid union 
organizers. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995). 
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dues.43 Further, even among the traditional hiring hall trades, 
contingent supplier agencies are making great inroads.44 This model 
may work well, however, in communities with a great need for 
unskilled labor and where unions are popular enough to organize a 
large proportion of the contingent labor force. 
C. Unions and Contingent Workers: The Mechanisms of Membership 
In a market that includes union jobs, the compensation that even a 
non-union employer will offer must keep pace with union rates in 
order to attract quality workers.45 Hence, the wages tend to increase 
with the presence of union jobs. With more union jobs available 
within a job market, wages and conditions will likely improve for 
contingent workers within that market.  
Historically, unions and contingent workers have not consistently 
been allies.46 On a practical level, employers sometimes use 
contingent workers to break a union’s organizing activity by using 
 
 43. Indeed, this author’s informal polling of non-union hiring hall construction workers 
has found that many workers prefer non-union shops to unionized shops because they do not 
perceive the difference in benefits to offset the costs in union dues. 
 44. For a recent case involving both a contingent construction supplier and “salting” by 
union workers, see W.D.D.W. Commercial Systems & Investments, Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. No. 25 
(2001). 
 See also Note, Organizing Worth Its Salt: The Protected Status of Paid Union Organizers, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 1341 (1995) (general discussion of the practice of salting). 
 See also WEIL, supra note 39 (Case 6-1), for a discussion of how non-union construction 
contractors are making gains against union hiring halls in Massachusetts. In this group of 
skilled workers, for whom mobility has been a traditional feature, the ability to supply a large 
pool of skilled workers to construction contractors is a chief bargaining tool vis-à-vis non-union 
construction firms. However, the study found that the corner on skilled, readily-available 
construction workers had begun to erode, and thus non-union firms are increasingly able to 
compete with union workers. Id. at 139-40. 
 45. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOUNDATION, WHAT’S NEXT FOR ORGANIZED LABOR? 12-17 
(Century Foundation Task Force on the Future of Unions ed., 1999); see also O’SULLIVAN & 
SHEFFRIN, supra note 25, at 387 (citing RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES MEDOFF, WHAT DO 
UNIONS DO? (Basic Books 1985)). 
 Unions may provide benefits for employers as well, in that they may increase productivity 
by increasing both job satisfaction and communication between management and workers. See 
O’SULLIVAN & SHEFFRIN, supra note 25, at 388-89. 
 46. See, e.g., Joyce L. Kornbluh, Ph.D., Historical Perspectives on Part-Time and 
Temporary Workers, in FLEXIBLE WORKSTYLES: A LOOK AT CONTINGENT LABOR 14, 19-20 
(WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 1988 CONFERENCE SUMMARY). 
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contingent workers as replacement workers.47 The type of 
relationship that exists between union and contingent workers 
depends upon the circumstances in which they encounter one another. 
In some cases, unions have fought hard against racial integration of 
the workforce, which could have had great implications where the 
lines between core and contingent workers included racial 
differences.48 For example, there are allegations that unions have 
subverted equal employment placement by using minority contingent 
workers for the least attractive jobs, while retaining the union work 
for white union members.49 In doing so, unions in the pre-Sturgis 
climate could be confident that such racially discriminatory 
placement practices would not breach any duty of fair representation 
to their members. A union would not have to consider the needs of 
the contingent workers, as the contingent workers could not accrete 
without joint employer consent.50  
D. User Employers 
User employers may use contingent workers simply to 
compensate some or all of their workforce at a lower rate than they 
would have to pay core workers.51 Unionized users may hire 
contingent workers to circumvent the conditions that a collective 
bargaining agreement imposes with respect to its core workers.52 A 
user may hire contingent workers so that it may have disparate pay 
arrangements within its workforce without hurting the morale of core 
 
 47. See PARKER, supra note 21, at 148. 
 48. See generally WILLIAM B. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS 207-08 
(1977); see also Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving, and Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 
BROOK. L. REV. 779, 794-803 (1992) (reviewing the history of how unions overtly 
discriminated against African Americans and how U.S. labor laws have impeded amelioration 
of this discrimination); Karl E. Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and the Struggle 
Against Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. REV. 157, 165-
73 (1982); DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 589-665 (4th ed. 2000) 
(1980); MAX GREEN, EPITAPH FOR AMERICAN LABOR: HOW UNION LEADERS LOST TOUCH 
WITH AMERICA 10 (1996). 
 49. Interview with Albert Moore, Manager, Pathways to Construction project, East-West 
Gateway Coordinating Council, in St. Louis, Mo. (Dec. 27, 2001).  
 50. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 51. Susan N. Houseman, Why Employers Use Flexible Staffing Arrangements: Evidence 
from an Establishment Survey, 47 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 155 (Oct. 2001).  
 52. HOUSEMAN, supra note 11, at 155. 
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workers.53  
As already noted, user employees also place contingent workers in 
the position of “buffers” between their core workers and the 
dynamics of the economy.54 Employers also use contingent workers 
to drive down the bargaining power of their core work force, and to 
break organizing campaigns by replacing core workers with 
contingent workers.55  
To minimize organizing capabilities, employers—both suppliers 
and users—isolate contingent workers and avoid extended work 
assignments.56 Management-side literature corroborates this practice, 
advising employers on how to avoid their core workers and 
contingent workers from organizing into, or joining through 
accretion, the same bargaining unit.57 These anti-organizing strategies 
 
 53. Id. at 156. 
 54. See NOLLEN & AXEL, supra note 18. 
 55. See PARKER, supra note 21. 
 56. Id. at 148. 
 57. In one such article, the author advises employers of traps involved in using contingent 
workers, and on circumnavigating protections for contingent workers. Brent Giddens, 
Terminating the Temporary Employee: A Trap for the Unwary Employer, 1997 ANDREWS EMP. 
LIT. REP. 21768 (Feb. 11, 1997). The user, Giddens begins, may wish to require the supplier to 
assume most of the supervisory and fiscal responsibility for the contingent workers they supply. 
Id.  
 Prescient of the Sturgis decision, Giddens goes on to advise that unionized employers and 
those users concerned about the possibility that contingent workers will be accreted into an 
existing bargaining unit, should minimize interaction between temporary employees and full-
time employees. Further, employers should clearly alienate core workers from contingent 
workers by “delineating boundaries,” restricting access to company information, and restricting 
access to work sites. Id. at 31. Employers should pay contingent workers from a source other 
than the regular employee payroll. The employer should not interfere with a temporary 
employee’s opportunities for other employment that may arise. Id. at 31. In these ways, an 
employer can avoid a situation where contingent workers share the same community of interest, 
and thereby avoid the possibility of a core worker/contingent worker bargaining unit. 
 See also NOLLEN & AXEL, supra note 18, at 189 Figure 7.2: “How much control do you 
have over your contingent workers?,” where Nolen offers employers a checklist for how to 
avoid control over contingent workers, and thus liability as a joint employer: 
1. Do you control or have the right to control: 
Recruiting and screening policies and procedures? 
Titles and job descriptions? 
Training? 
Assignment or supervision of work, shifts, hours of service, and additional projects? 
Payment of compensation? 
Benefits and leave policies? 
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appear to focus on tactics that further isolate contingent workers from 
core workers, such as the use of finite work assignments to prevent 
contingent workers from developing expectations of continued co-
existence with a site’s core workers.58  
III. THE STURGIS DECISION 
A. Background 
Two discrete cases comprised the Sturgis ruling. The first case 
involved a user engaged in light industrial manufacturing: M.B. 
Sturgis, Inc., of Maryland Heights, Missouri. Its employees, both 
core workers and contingent workers supplied by Interim, were 
engaged in the same low-skill, light industrial work.59 The Textile 
Processors, Service Trades, Health Care, Professional & Technical 
Employees International Union Local 108 (Local 108) represented 
the core workers, and the contingent workers were not represented.  
The other case in Sturgis involved Jeffboat Division, American 
 
2. Do you establish or have the right to establish: 
Pay rates? 
Office policies and procedures? 
Manner in which work is performed? 
Promotions or transfers? 
3. Have you reserved the right to: 
Discipline? 
Transfer? 
Promote? 
Discharge? 
Request a replacement worker if you receive unsatisfactory service? 
4. Have you specified in the written agreement with the staffing firm that contingent 
workers supplied under the agreement are independent contractors? 
Though Giddens does not suggest it, one wonders whether this kind of advice will be a death 
knell to many contingent workers’ hopes of finding a permanent job through contingent work. 
See Giddens, supra, at 32. On the other hand, Nolen and Axel actually recommend that 
employers offer contingent workers core jobs. NOLLEN & AXEL, supra note 18, at 139, 143-44. 
Hiring into the core has two advantages: the employer gets increased productivity (through 
greater morale) out of the contingent workers and retains the employer’s training investment. 
Id. 
 58. See Giddens, supra note 57. See also Paul H. Derrick, Unions Now Able to Organize 
Temporary Workers, 12 S.C. LAW. 15, 17 (2001).  
 59. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1298-99. 
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Commercial Marine Service Company and TT&O Enterprises, Inc. 
(Jeffboat), a shipbuilding operation based in Indiana on the Ohio 
River.60 Jeffboat had 600 production and maintenance employees. In 
addition, there were thirty first-class welders and steamfitters that a 
supplier agency, TT&O, sent to work at Jeffboat. The Teamsters 
represented the core workers, and the TT&O contingent workers 
were not represented.61 
At first glance, it may seem surprising that the employer/union 
pairs in the two cases comprising Sturgis should be diametrically 
opposed with regard to their positions on accretion of contingent 
workers into the bargaining unit. M.B. Sturgis, Inc. fought the Local 
108, urging a unit comprised of Sturgis’ core employees alongside 
the contingent workers.62 Conversely, Jeffboat Division opposed the 
Teamsters’ call for accretion of the core and contingent forces.63 
Jeffboat Division wanted these workers to form separate bargaining 
units.64 Hence, both the employers and the unions were respectively 
opposed on this issue. Reflection upon the reasons why the two sets 
of employers and unions in these cases were at diametrical odds 
offers insight into the complexity of the effect of Sturgis on workers’ 
rights. 
B. Sturgis and Organizing Principles 
1. Joint Employer versus Multiemployer 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) fails to provide an 
exact definition of “employee;”65 rather, the NLRB usually examines 
 
 60. Id. at 1300. 
 61. Id. at 1300-01. 
 62. Id. at 1300. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1994): 
 The term “employee” shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the 
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise 
. . . and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent 
employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, 
or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual 
employed  by  his  parent  or  spouse,  or any  individual  having  the status of an 
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the circumstances to determine whether an operation is an 
employer.66 More than one entity may employ any particular worker. 
If the NLRB determines that an operation is an employer, it must 
resolve whether the employer is a joint employer or a multiemployer. 
The NLRB considers employers joint if they “share or co-determine 
those matters governing essential terms and conditions of 
employment”67—the “right of control” test.68 In Sturgis, the NLRB 
began by deciding that the users, M.B. Sturgis and Jeffboat, were 
joint employers with its suppliers Interim and TT&O, respectively.69 
The NLRB based its determination in Sturgis on whether the 
employers “meaningfully affect[ed] matters relating to the 
employment relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, 
supervision, and direction.”70 
In general, a union and an employer must agree on the bargaining 
unit appropriate to any given workplace. In the event that they are 
unable to agree, the NLRB has the power under § 9 of the NLRA71 to 
 
independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor . . . or by any other 
person who is not an employer as herein defined. 
 66. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 98 (13th ed. 2001). 
 67. NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 691 F.2d 1117, 1123 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 68. For an excellent discussion of the right of control test, the alternative economic 
realities test, and a hybrid of the two, see Rahebi, supra note 11, at 1115-21. 
 In Laerco Transp. & Warehouse, the Board held that “[t]o establish joint employer status, 
there must be a showing that the employer meaningfully affects matters relating to the 
employment relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision, and direction.” 269 
N.L.R.B. 324 (1984) (cited in Rahebi, supra note 11, at 1116). 
 Rahebi goes on to analyze what factors the courts have considered in determining joint 
employer status. Id. These factors include whether the user retains authority to supervise the 
workers daily (citing NLRB v. Western Temp. Servs., Inc., 821 F.2d 1258, 1266 (7th Cir. 
1987); Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1122; TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798, 798 (1984); 
W.W. Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 860 F.2d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1988); Clinton’s Ditch Coop. Co. v. 
NLRB, 778 F.2d 132, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1985)); hire and fire (citing W.W. Grainger, 860 F.2d at 
247; Clinton’s Ditch Coop., 778 F.2d at 138; Ref-Chem Co. v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 127, 129 (5th 
Cir. 1969)); discipline (citing Clinton’s Ditch Coop. Co., 778 F.2d at 138); set work rules and 
conditions (citing W.W. Grainger, 860 F.2d at 247); give instructions and assignments (citing 
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. NLRB, 879 F.2d 1526, 1531 (7th Cir. 1989)); refuse referrals 
(citing W.W. Grainger, 860 F.2d at 247); and determine compensation (citing Bonnette v. 
California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 69. 331 N.L.R.B. 1298. 
 70. Id. at 1301 (citing TLI, Inc., 271 N.L.R.B. 798 (1984)). The Board’s analysis 
corresponded almost wholly with the “right of control” test described by Rahebi. See Rahebi, 
supra note 11, at 1116-18. 
 71. NLRA § 159(b). 
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determine an appropriate unit.72 Significantly, none of the parties 
involved in the Sturgis cases could agree on the appropriate unit.73  
In Sturgis, the NLRB found that a user and supplier did not have 
to consent in order for the NLRB to form a bargaining unit made up 
of contingent and core workers because they were, in fact, joint 
employers. The arrangement did not constitute a multiemployer 
situation.74 This conclusion was based on the NLRB’s finding that 
employees of a single employer made an appropriate bargaining unit 
where the workers shared a community of interest.75 In doing so, the 
NLRB overruled its decision in Lee Hospital76 and returned to its 
prior stance under Greenhoot.77 This odd situation continues to exist, 
however, under Greenhoot; thus, where there are only two workers 
involved, their consent is not necessary to combine core and 
contingent workers. Consent is necessary, however, if there are more 
than two user agencies involved.78 
2. Community of Interest 
In determining the proper bargaining unit for workers in Sturgis, 
the NLRB relied on the “community of interest.”79 A community of 
interest is determined by the similarity of job functions, earnings, 
schedules, and skills requirements between the groups of workers.80 
 
 72. Under the NLRA, the NLRB has broad discretion to pick an appropriate unit, though 
the statute does not mandate the selection of any particular one. See NLRB v. Target, 547 F.2d 
421 (8th Cir. 1977). So long as the Board provides support for its determination and does not 
act “arbitrarily or capriciously,” there is no judicial review of NLRB bargaining unit 
determinations. Id. at 423 (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490-91 
(1951); Packard Motor Car. Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1947); NLRB v. Hoerner-
Waldorf Corp., 525 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1975); Stephens Produce Co. v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 1373, 
1378 (8th Cir. 1975)). 
 See also Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), where the Supreme Court held that the 
NLRB had overstepped its bounds and contravened § 9 of the NLRA when it included 
professional employees in a unit with non-professional employees, without giving the former 
opportunity to vote for inclusion.  
 73. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1302. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See infra Part III for a discussion of community of interest doctrine. 
 76. 300 N.L.R.B. 947. 
 77. See Greenhoot, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 250 (1973); Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1304-08. 
 78. See Schiffer, supra note 5. 
 79. CARRELL & HEAVRIN, supra note 3, at 120. 
 80. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1305 (citing Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 
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As a result of Sturgis, the NLRB now views contingent workers who 
work alongside core workers in a joint-employer setting in the same 
way that it views two groups of core workers for the purpose of 
determining whether a community of interest exists.  
Accretion of contingent workers into an existing unit of core 
workers can potentially cause a host of problems.81 In the first place, 
contingent workers do not receive the opportunity to vote on 
representation when they join a bargaining unit via accretion.82 The 
NLRB agreed with employer M.B. Sturgis, Inc., that the community 
of interest doctrine should be the sole determiner of the appropriate 
bargaining unit in a joint-employer situation.83 With community of 
interest as the crucial criterion of adjudging the appropriateness of a 
unit, the contingent workers’ lack of voting privileges upon accretion 
should be an important factor in adjudging whether a community of 
interest actually exists between core and contingent workers. 
Despite the supposition of commonality inherent in the 
“community of interest” doctrine, if contingent workers are a 
minority within a bargaining unit, their interests may suffer if the 
interests of core workers and contingent workers are not the same, or 
if the bargaining representative favors core workers.84  
Experts such as the Communications Workers of America and 
Catherine Ruckleshaus, of the Employment Law Center, urge for a 
liberal construction of “community of interest” so as to allow as 
many contingent workers as possible to join bargaining units with 
core workers.85 Ruckleshaus argues that the potential benefits 
 
137 (1962); Swift & Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 1391 (1961); Continental Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 777, 
782-783 (1952)). 
 81. The accretion doctrine informs the NLRB’s practice of adding new groups of workers 
to an existing bargaining unit. CARRELL & HEAVRIN, supra note 3, at 122. According to the 
established doctrine, workers may be added to a unit if they satisfy a community of interest test, 
which takes into account bargaining history, interchange of employees, geographic proximity, 
common supervision, and (though not in the case of M.B. Sturgis) the union’s desires. Id. 
 82. Steven G. Rush, New Growth on an Old Vine: Labor-Management Relations and the 
NLRA, BENCH & B. OF MINN. 29, 31 (Sept. 2001). 
 83. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1305. 
 84. Rush, supra note 82. For instance, where a core unit has a “buffer zone” of contingent 
workers, a severe divergence of interests would likely exist. The more power a union has in a 
combined bargaining unit, the less secure a bargaining agreement may be for contingent 
workers. 
 85. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 33. 
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overcome any disparity of interests, in that accretion is the only way 
to stop the extensive out-sourcing and subcontracting that employers 
currently use to undermine core workers’ security.86 Organizing 
across job sectors, regardless of contingent or core status, these 
experts argue, is necessary to keep decent jobs.87  
Yet at the M.B. Sturgis, Inc. facility, Local 108 contended that the 
accretion of contingent workers into the core workers unit made both 
groups more difficult to organize.88 Though contingent workers and 
core workers at a given workplace may have enough in common to 
pass the community of interest litmus test, and may thus be combined 
into one bargaining unit, the differences that do exist between the two 
groups may put them directly at odds with one another. For instance, 
if the group of contingent workers is made up of a majority of 
workers for whom job permanency is not a priority, their inclusion in 
a combined unit may mean that job security would suffer for all 
workers in the unit after subsequent bargaining. Thus, in some 
workplaces, the accretion of a flood of undercompensated, 
underutilized workers may dilute the bargaining unit’s power to 
bargain. For instance, during this time of economic recession, market 
volatility, with the increased popularity of using contingent workers, 
the use of a more liberal reading of community of interest 
core/contingent disparities may cause a resurgence of two-tiered 
compensation structures. 89 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1300. 
 89. A two-tiered structure occurs when new members, in this case contingent workers, 
join a bargaining unit and receive less compensation or generally fewer bargaining concessions 
on issues such as job security, hours, or benefits than members hired previously. In the case of 
contingent workers, job insecurity is already a built-in disparity that may resemble such a tiered 
system.  
 The duty of fair representation, which is the doctrine whereby minorities (be they 
numerical, racial, or gender-based) are entitled to representation that is equally zealous to that 
of the majority, should preclude this from happening. See Note, Two-Tier Wage Discrimination 
and the Duty of Fair Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 631 (1985) [hereinafter Two-Tier Wage 
Discrimination]. However, the possibility always exists that an undetected, de facto violation 
could occur because there is no systematic evaluation of whether a union has met its duty. Id. at 
631-32.  
 Two-tier compensation structures became extremely effective tools of the union-busting 
campaigns in the 1980s. The Reagan and Bush administrations were hostile to labor unions and 
amorous of industry deregulation. Further, a difficult economy and an atmosphere of corporate 
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A broad construction of community of interest may run counter to 
the bargaining history between an employer and employee.90 
Considering that before Sturgis, core and contingent workers could 
only form a joint bargaining unit with both employers’ consent, few 
bargaining units created post-Sturgis will meet the criterion of a 
shared bargaining history. This history is bound to define and perhaps 
reflect the expectations, and possible preferences, of the workers.91 
IV. EFFECTS OF STURGIS ON THE LABOR MARKET 
A. What Sturgis May Do for the Majority of Contingent Workers 
The NLRB’s criteria for bargaining unit inclusion remains a great 
hurdle for most contingent workers. The community of interest 
principle assumes that the contingent and core workers have similar 
duties, shared supervision, and that the contingent workers remain at 
the user’s worksite to share the community of interest. This 
 
raiding made the climate quite ripe for such union-busting techniques. See generally Charles G. 
Moerdler, Deregulation—The United States Experience, 6 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 177 (1989). The 
effects of the introduction of two-tier compensation systems are still being felt. For example, 
until the 1980s supermarkets generally paid personnel such as checkers a decent, living wage. 
When bargaining power decreased for grocers’ unions in the 1980s, they were forced to accept 
two-tier compensation structures as a concession. Before long, management fired the higher-
tiered first-hired checkers and replaced them with the lower paid new hires. Since that time, 
checkers are generally paid wages close to the minimum wage and often do not have full-time 
status. See generally Table 1: “CPS Grocery Store Employees and Operating Measures: Sample 
Means and Standard Deviations, 1984 and 1994,” in John W. Budd & Brian P. McCall, The 
Grocery Stores Wage Distribution: A Semi-Parametric Analysis of the Role of Retailing and 
Labor Market Institutions, 54 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 484, 487 (2001) (comparing grocery-
store employees between 1984 and 1994, showing a decrease in real wages and a dramatic 
increase in use of part-time employees (from 32.24% in 1984 to 55.29% in 1994)). 
 Though two-tier compensation structures became less popular in the 1990s, employers 
continue to bargain for two-tier bargaining units and such units remain a source of contention 
between management and labor. See Two-Tier Pay Structures Still Appeal to Employers, 154 
LAB. REL. REP. 289, 309 (Mar. 23, 1997); see also FMCS Expanding Mediation Activities, 154 
LAB. REL. REP. 33, 61 (Jan. 20, 1997) (attributing the decline in union membership and 
collective bargaining to, inter alia, two-tier compensation structures); USW Identifies Future 
Key Bargaining Elements, 164 LAB. REL. REP. 513, 539 (2000) (indicating the importance of 
opposing two-tier compensation agreements to the United Steelworkers’ wage security).  
 90. See COX, supra note 36, at 98. 
 91. The employment law firm of Vogel, Weir, Hunke & McCormick advises users to 
argue that contingent workers should not accrete to a unit because of this lack of shared 
bargaining history. Temporary Workers May Now Join Unions with Regular Employees,  N.D. 
EMP. L. LETTER (BNA), Oct. 2000, at 6. 
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requirement provides almost no benefit for the contingent worker 
who is not assigned for a long period, or whose role the supplier or 
user has carefully prescribed to avoid accretion.92 
For the contingent worker who is eligible for accretion, the best 
candidate for success under the current system would less resemble 
the typical contingent worker, and instead, more like the core worker. 
This worker would join the ranks of the core workers at some point, 
or would move along to another job per her desire or need. For the 
contingent worker who joins the core, Sturgis would have only short-
term significance. For the latter worker, and for all other contingent 
workers, the hiring hall or agency-specific bargaining unit is likely 
the best chance for increasing bargaining power. Hence, Sturgis has 
little impact here, either. 
B. Unions  
Labor organizations such as the AFL-CIO have hailed the Sturgis 
decision and are now actively organizing contingent workers.93 For 
unions, the detriment of having larger, more diverse bargaining units 
to organize employees such as at M.B. Sturgis may be offset by a 
careful reading of community of interest, and by more sophisticated 
organizing strategy.94 The general organizing market may benefit 
when there is a larger group of potential workers and when there are 
more bargaining unit configurations available for organizing. 
Yet some criticize the expansion of collective bargaining rights to 
contingent workers as being out of touch with the needs of contingent 
workers.95 The job-specific bargaining unit may not suit contingent 
 
 92. Schiffer points out that, for the contingent worker considered “seasonal” or “casual,” 
voting membership in a unit remains elusive unless the worker has “a reasonable expectation of 
continued employment and work[s] sufficient hours to have a substantial and continuing 
interest in the working conditions of regular employees.” Schiffer, supra note 5, at 179 (citing 
Caribbean Communications Corp., 309 N.L.R.B. 712 (1992); New World Communications, 
333 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (1999)). 
 93. John Sweeney, President of the AFL-CIO called Sturgis an “important step” in 
organizing contingent workers. Derrick, supra note 58, at 17. 
 94. See Ruckelshaus, supra note 33. 
 95. For example, see Stone, supra note 16, at 622-24, for recommendations on radical 
policy changes such as geographically-based “citizen’s unions” rather than unions made up of 
job-specific, rather than worker-based, bargaining units. Howard Wial, of the U.S. Department 
of Labor, offers a similar model of geographic and loosely occupational “works councils” for 
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workers, because contingent workers must switch jobs and follow the 
market for their services—unlike the core employee whose situation 
has traditionally been more static.96 The institution of collective 
bargaining as we know it may need drastic changes to accommodate 
the needs of contingent workers.97 With increasing flexibility built 
into the labor market, union organizing will have to strategize around 
this new focus and depend less upon its traditional core-worker 
organizing paradigm. Sturgis does little to inform this process, but 
merely fashions the contingent worker as a potential participant in the 
core-worker paradigm. 
C. Efforts of Employers to Circumvent Organizing 
In considering union membership for contingent workers, a major 
concern is whether the contingent worker is too vulnerable, or too 
detached from her fellow workers to maximize her potential 
bargaining power when she is included in a bargaining unit with core 
workers. It is a violation of §§ 7 and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA for a user 
or supplier employer to deliberately interfere with organizing 
behavior through hiring and scheduling practices.98 However, the 
question remains whether employers have too much power available 
for contravening any bargaining potential resulting from Sturgis.  
Local 108’s vehement opposition to the outcome of the Sturgis 
decision attests to the complexity of understanding Sturgis’ impact; it 
is still unclear whether accretion will mean more difficulties for 
employers or for unions. In any given bargaining situation, employers 
are likely to use contingent workers as pawns in their struggle for 
bargaining power. 
 
union organizing. Howard Wial, The Emerging Organizational Structure of Unionism in Low-
Wage Services, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 671 (1993). See also WEIL, supra note 39. 
 For more optimistic accounts of worker/employer relations, see Neal Herrick, Joint 
Management & Employee Participation: Labor & Management at the Crossroads (1990); 
William N. Cooke, Labor-Management Cooperation (Upjohn Inst. for Empl. Res. 1990).  
 96. Stone, supra note 16, at 622-24. 
 97. See, e.g., JAMES R. GREEN, THE WORLD OF THE WORKER, LABOR IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 210-48 (Illini Books 1998) (1980); see also WEIL, supra note 39. 
 98. NLRA, §§ 7, 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1994). 
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The Sturgis decision may put an end to some employers’ practice 
of using contingent workers to avoid organizing by core workers.99 
Sturgis may not have such an effect, however, if employers maximize 
their anti-organizing strategic potential. The post-Sturgis climate may 
serve as an incubator for employer-side ideas for strategic personnel 
policy designed to thwart contingent worker organization. If 
implemented to its fullest extent, Sturgis may have the ironic effect of 
entrenching further insecurity and alienation for contingent workers 
by compelling suppliers and users to construct contingent worker 
arrangements even more carefully. These increased employer efforts 
may thereby deflate any community of interest or worker 
expectations. The resultant vulnerability of contingent workers could 
entice employers to replace more of their core positions with 
contingent ones. 
Further, accretion of contingent workers can weaken organizing 
efforts.100 Local 108 reasoned that the contingency workers supplied 
 
 99. See McGolrick, supra note 10, at AA1-2 (quoting Linda Foley, President of the 
Newspaper Guild, affiliated with the Communications Workers of America, saying that Sturgis 
should “put the brakes” on employers using temps to break organizing). 
 100. Telephone interview with John Watson, Organizing Director, Textile Processors, 
Service Trades, Health Care, Professional & Technical Employees International Union Local 
108 (Sept. 15, 2001). 
 There may be any number of explanations for this blurring of employer/union positions 
between the two cases. Comparing the factors that stand out in each case offers some, though 
not conclusive, explanation. At M.B. Sturgis, the factors that stand out are the proportion of 
core members to contingent workers, the fact that both contingent and core jobs were unskilled, 
and that the union characterized the contingent workers as bad workers. 
 It could be that the contingent workers from Interim had made clear that they had no 
interest in joining a union. This could be because the contingent workers did not see any 
potential benefit of paying union dues when they had no reasonable expectation of permanent 
placement. Perhaps Jeffrey Joerres, President and CEO of Manpower, Inc. (one of the largest 
supplier agencies in the United States and the world) was correct when he claimed that Sturgis 
would have little effect on contingent workers because over ninety percent of contingent 
workers work only about 300 hours per year (quoted in David Kelly, Temps Granted Access to 
Unions, HR WIRE (Sept. 11, 2000)). 
 In this case, it may be that the supply of unskilled workers was quite high and the 
competition for core jobs fierce. Mistrust likely arose when contingent workers competed for 
core jobs. 
 Racism may have been a factor as well. The St. Louis area is one of the most segregated 
areas of the country. Moreover, the nationwide unemployment rate for African Americans is 
over twice the average for Whites. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation Summary, 
Oct. 2002 (Nov. 1, 2002), available at http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm. It may 
be inferred that African American workers would be less likely hired for core positions because 
of racism, and hence they would be available for contingent work. The core workers at M.B. 
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by Interim Staffing were difficult to organize.101 This stemmed from 
the organizers’ perceptions of the contingent workers themselves,102 
and from Interim’s practice of keeping workers on a particular job for 
just a few days at a time.103 This difficulty of organization is the 
reason why employers, such as M.B. Sturgis, Inc., may sometimes 
prefer a liberal construction of “community of interest.”104  
Nevertheless, others argue that the Sturgis decision is not likely to 
benefit employers in the long run. Employers who believe otherwise 
may be “at best, misguided,” as labor experts Kenneth Dolin and 
Scott Rozmus contend.105 Prior to Sturgis, employers who had a good 
relationship with supplier agencies may have been able to obtain 
these supplier agencies’ consent, if they found such an arrangement 
would be in their best interests in any given situation. Such a 
situation was quite clear at the M.B. Sturgis facility. The ratio of 
workers equaled roughly three contingent workers for every seven 
core workers.106 Both groups of workers were working low-skill jobs 
and were therefore presumably fungible, thus making core workers 
less secure in the presence of contingent workers.107 With such a high 
ratio of contingent to core workers, with similarly fungible groups, 
the unite-and-conquer strategy would likely pay off for employers.  
Sturgis will have a greater effect for users such as Jeffboat, who 
 
Sturgis may have been mainly white, and the contingent workers mainly African American. 
Perhaps racial mistrust made the two groups of workers wary of joining the other’s bargaining 
unit. That is, either the whites were racist and exclusionary, or the African Americans were. It is 
commonly perceived in cities such as St. Louis, where there is a great racial divide, that 
workers often ignore a commonality of class interest in favor of racial biases. 
 At Jeffboat, the factors that stand out are the proportion of core to contingent workers 
(600:30), and that both core and contingent workers were doing skilled work. Sturgis, 331 
N.L.R.B. at 1300. The Teamsters representing the core workers may have recognized that both 
groups had a commonality of skills, and were not threatened by the low ratio of core workers to 
contingent workers. 
 101. Id.  
 102. The organizers perceived the Interim contingent workers to be uncommitted to 
working a full-time, permanent position. Id. Whether or not this perception was correct, it is 
telling of some of the hurdles, real or perceived, that unions and contingent workers must 
overcome in order for both to maximize the potential of the Sturgis decision.  
 103. Id. at 1299-1300. 
 104. Id. at 1298. 
 105. Dolin & Rozmus, supra note 7. 
 106. Sturgis, 331 N.L.R.B. at 1299. 
 107. Watson, supra note 100. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p295 Hely note book pages.doc  1/14/2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
320 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 11:295 
 
do not want to see a bargaining unit combined of two groups of 
workers artificially segregated by tenure status alone. The similarity 
of skills, job assignments, and other “community of interest” 
indicators gave these workers a common interest in organizing as a 
unified unit. Sturgis removed a powerful tool that users and suppliers 
could previously use at their discretion to prevent these workers from 
recognizing their common interests; as such, the employers’ mutual 
consent was no longer relevant to the equation.108 
For such employers, hiring more contingent workers may seem 
risky.109 Yet it is difficult to imagine that most users will overreact to 
Sturgis by eliminating their use of contingent workers when anti-
organizing precautions such as those discussed above are easily 
within the grasp of most employers.  
Those users and suppliers who do find themselves as joint 
employers and who must bargain with a combined core/contingent 
unit will have many difficulties to overcome. Many of these will stem 
from the fact that the supplier and user may not have precise ideas 
about their roles, or how to circumvent their conflicts of interest.110 
 
 108. See Dolin & Rozmus, supra note 7. 
 109. Less flexibility and even greater bargaining power would likely mean that users would 
reap fewer benefits in using contingent workers. This could present a paradox, as simple 
economics dictate that as contingent workers become less useful for users, the less they will use 
or pay them. See O’SULLIVAN & SHEFFRIN, supra note 25, at 277-78. David Kelly cites two 
employment-side sources who decry Sturgis as having put a chilling effect on the use of 
contingent workers. See Kelly, supra note 100. One labor lawyer characterized hiring 
contingent workers to bringing in a “Trojan Horse” from which undercompensated union 
activists may emerge. Id. The Employment Policy Foundation, a pro-employer think tank, says 
that Sturgis could lead the United States down a slippery slope where losses in employment, 
productivity, and economic growth could result from a new hesitance to hire contingent 
workers. Id. 
 110. Steven Rush notes: 
The relationship of the user and supplier employers at the bargaining table could be 
problematic. There could be ambiguity over the relative responsibility of each 
employer as to certain terms and conditions of employment of the temporary workers. 
The user and supplier employers’ interests may actually conflict, complicating the 
process of reaching agreement with the union or in conducting potential strike 
planning. 
Rush, supra note 82, at 31. 
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D. Core Workers and Contingent Workers 
The age-old struggle between the core and the peripheral, the 
greater-skilled and the lesser-skilled, will continue as always in the 
post-Sturgis climate. Contingent workers will likely remain 
marginalized in situations where their job duties and tenures keep 
them out of contact with core workers. Core workers, as a result, will 
not likely see their common interest with workers whose 
vulnerability may be a frightening reminder of the precariousness of 
their own situations. Where ethnic, racial, or perceived class 
boundaries divide the groups, the possibility of accretion will not 
likely benefit contingent workers. In these cases, as at M.B. Sturgis, 
Inc., employers will continue to urge accretion in order to unite and 
conquer by manipulating the interests of core workers against 
contingent workers. Sturgis, however, does afford one more vehicle 
for contingent and core workers to see their mutual interests. This 
recognition may be crucial for gaining future bargaining rights for all 
workers, whether core or contingent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The advantages that Sturgis presents in increased organizing may 
outweigh the potential conflicts in organizing joint-employer units of 
core and contingent workers. The net sum of benefits for contingent 
workers due to an increasingly unionized labor market, and 
specifically, unionized job assignments, may outweigh the concern 
that core workers’ interests will overwhelm contingent workers’ 
interests within the same bargaining units.  
Employers will continue to need flexibility as the economy 
responds to global economic demands. Our society will have to 
address this need by considering how to secure adequate employment 
for its citizens. Labor policy or organizing strategy may inform how 
this takes place. In the grand scheme of things, Sturgis is a timid step 
in the direction of empowering contingent workers, whose role 
embodies the risks inherent in flexibility. 
Strategies other than those that combine core and contingent 
workers would better benefit the majority of contingent workers. A 
worker-based, occupational model such as the hiring hall model, 
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agency-specific model,111 or perhaps a geographic, occupational 
union112 appear the most conducive to securing the benefits of union 
membership for these workers who do not fit neatly into the 
established organizing schemes.  
The question of whether Sturgis could be overturned by the 
current Republican ascendance seems less pressing in the final 
analysis. The future of Sturgis and its progeny will depend upon 
whom the Bush appointees to the NLRB think the decision has most 
benefited. It seems likely that NLRB decisions in the near future will 
maximize Sturgis’ potential in favor of management. 
 
 111. The success of this model would depend, of course, on contingent workers’ ability to 
organize per agency-specific bargaining units in enough numbers to offset the competitive force 
of non-union agencies in the same markets. 
 112. See Wial, supra note 95. A geographic “citizens’” union such as Stone proposes may 
also offer the potential for allowing contingent workers to organize, but this model does not 
account for the high degree of mobility within a flexible workforce. Additionally, it mentions 
nothing of a unifying principle of common interest such as shared occupation that would be 
integral to a meaningful bargaining agenda. 
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